Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 41

Issue 2

Article 14

Spring 3-1-1984

IX . Evidence

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
IX . Evidence, 41 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 746 (1984).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol41/iss2/14
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41:491

effectiveness. 96 The court's business necessity guidelines, therefore, limit an

employer's ability to abuse the business necessity defense in the name of general
social good.97

BRADFORD FROST ENGLANDER

IX. EVIDENCE
A.

Admissibility of Prior Consistent Statements

Prior to the promulgation of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)' in
1975, prior consistent statements2 were admissible for rehabilitative use but
were inadmissible as substantive evidence. 3 In other words, a witness' prior
consistent statements were admissible on rebuttal only to corroborate the witness
after opposing counsel had impeached the witness on cross-examination by
asserting that the witness had fabricated testimony.' Prior to 1975, courts
regarded prior consistent statements offered substantively to prove the truth
of the witness' testimony as inadmissible hearsay.5 Under rule 801(d)(1)(B),
96. See 697 F.2d at 1190-91; supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit requires proof of necessity and effectiveness); cf. Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216,
219 (10th Cir. 1972) (as degree of human and economic risk increases, the burden on the employer
to establish the relationship between the employment criteria and the job performance decreases).
97. See Stohner & Underhill, supra note 83, at 28 (establishing necessity and effectiveness
of fetal protection program will be expensive and difficult).
1. See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(l)(B); see also infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)).
2. See FED. R. Evm. 801(c). Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) defines "statement" as an
oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct by a person if the person intends his nonverbal
conduct as an assertion. Id.
3. See FED. R. Evm. 801 advisory committee note (subsection (d)(l)(B)). Prior consistent
statements traditionally were admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper motive
but not as substantive evidence. Id. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) prior consistent
statements are admissible as substantive evidence. See id.; see also Graham, Prior Consistent
Statements, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the FederalRule of Evidence, Critiqueand Proposal,30 HAsTiNGs
L.J. 575, 577-78 (1979) (reviewing history of admissibility of prior consistent statements); infra
text accompanying notes 4-5 (distinguishing between substantive and rehabilitative use of prior
consistent statements).
4. See Graham, supra note 3, at 578. A party offers substantive evidence to prove the
truth of the content of the witness' testimony. See id. A party offers rehabilitative evidence solely
to corroborate the witness. See id. Although before 1800, prior consistent statements were admissible in a litigant's case-in-chief to corroborate a witness, by the early 1800's, prior consistent
statements were inadmissible for any reason in a litigant's case-in-chief but were admissible on
rebuttal to corroborate an impeached witness. See id.
5. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing pre-rule 801(d)(1)(B) admissibility of prior consistent statements); see also FED. R. EviD. 801(c) ("hearsay" under rule 801
is out-of-court statement proponent offers in evidence to prove truth of matter asserted); C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 604 (2d ed. 1972) (prior consistent statements inadmissible hear-
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however, prior consistent statements are now admissible as substantive
evidence. 6 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides that an out-of-court statement is not
hearsay when the declarant testifies at trial and the opposing counsel crossexamines the declarant if the statement meets two express conditions.' First,
the prior statement must be consistent with the declarant's in-court testimony,
and second, the proponent must offer the statement to rebut an express or
implied charge of either recent fabrication or improper influence or motive
against the declarant. 8
Although rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides that prior consistent statements must
meet only two express conditions to be admissible, courts are split on the issue
of whether the rule impliedly includes a third condition for admissibility.9 A
number of circuits have held that in order for a prior consistent statement
to be admissible under rule 801(d)(1)(B) for any purpose, the declarant must
have made the prior consistent statement before the declarant possessed a
motive to lie.'" In United States v. Parodi," the Fourth Circuit considered
whether rule 801(d)(1)(B) conditions the admissibility of prior consistent
statements offered solely to rehabilitate an impeached witness on the absence2
of a motive to fabricate at the time the witness made the prior statement.'

say under traditional rule). The rehabilitative use of prior consistent statements presents no hearsay problem because the proponent offers the statement solely to establish that the defendant
in fact made the statement and not to prove the truth of anything the defendant asserted. See
FED. R. Evm. 801 advisory committee note (subsection (c)). The inevitable interplay between
the substantive and rehabilitative effect of a prior consistent statement complicates the distinction
between the substantive and rehabilitative use of prior consistent statements. See Graham, supra
note 3, at 579-80. By corroborating a witness, a prior consistent statement buttresses the witness'
credibility and thus indirectly provides probative evidence of the truth of the content of the witness'
testimony. See id. at 580.
6. See FED. R. EviD. 801 advisory committee note (subsection (dX1)(B)) (prior consistent
statements admissible for substantive as well as rehabilitative use).
7. See infra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing rule 801(d)(1)(B)).
8. See FED. R. Evw. 801(d)(1)(B). The terms "recent fabrication" and "improper influence or motive" included in rule 801(d)(1)(B) are subject to conflicting interpretations. See
S. SALTZBURO & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EvmENCE MANuAL 499-500 (3d ed. 1982). The
term "recent fabrication" applies to a witness whom opposing counsel charges with a deliberate
lie. Id. at 500. The term "improper influence or motive" does not apply to a witness whom
opposing counsel charges with a deliberate lie but rather to a witness whom opposing counsel
alleges may have had a motive to or whom circumstances may have influenced to distort his
testimony unconsciously. Id. Rule 801(d)(IXB) permits a trial judge to admit a prior consistent
statement to rehabilitate either type of witness. See id. But see J. WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER, 4
\VErsTEiN's EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)(B) at 801-119 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1982). Professor Weinstein
states that normal usage dictates that the terms "fabrication," "motive," and "influence" in
rule 801(d)(l)(B) only cover situations in which the witness deliberately lies on the stand. See
id. Weinstein notes that rule 801(d)(1)(B) only applies when opposing counsel suggests that the
witness consciously fabricated his testimony. See id.
9. See supra text accompanying note 8 (discussing rule 801(d)(l)(B)); infra notes 31-41
& 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing split of authority on admissibility of prior consistent
statements).
10. See infra notes 34-37 & 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing cases that hold rule
801(d)(1)(B) conditions admissibility of prior consistent statements on absence of motive to fabricate).
11. 703 F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1983).
12. See id. at 781-87.
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In Parodi,the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina convicted five defendants for conspiracy to violate federal narcotics
statutes. I3 Three defendants appealed their convictions to the Fourth Circuit,
raising several contentions of error. 4 Defendant Parodi contended that the
trial court erred by admitting a government witness' prior consistent statements
that the government offered to rehabilitate the witness.' 5 The government
witness, Ozella, was a coconspirator who was cooperating with the
government.16 On direct examination, Ozella testified about his pretrial interviews with a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent in which Ozella
13. See id. at 772-73. In United States v. Parodi,the government indicted 11 persons for
conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of federal narcotics statutes. Id. The United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina eventually convicted 10 defendants but
only 3, Parodi, Conway, and Laws, appealed their convictions. Id. The appellants in Parodi
set forth several contentions of error. Id. at 773. All three defendants objected, contending that
the trial court erred in failing to sequester a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent
during trial and allowing the agent to testify on rebuttal. Id. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the
objection and found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. See id. at 773-75. All three
defendants also complained that the trial judge's interference in the trial by asking a witness
two questions on rebuttal was prejudicial to the defendants. Id. at 773, 775. The Fourth Circuit
found that the trial judge properly questioned the witness and did not prejudice the defendants.
See id. at 775-78. Defendant Parodi separately charged that the trial judge's denial of Parodi's
motion to sever his trial from that of the other defendants was error. Id. at 773, 778. The Parodi
court dismissed Parodi's objection, finding that the trial judge's denial of Parodi's motion for
severance did not result in a miscarriage of justice. See id. at 778-81. Parodi also attacked the
trial judge's admission of prior consistent statements of Ozella, a government witness, to rehabilitate
the witness. Id. at 773, 781. The Fourth Circuit found that Ozella's prior consistent statements
were admissible. See id. at 781-787; see also infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text (discussing
Fourth Circuit's finding that Ozella's prior consistent statements were admissible). Parodi also
contended that the trial judge erred in refusing Parodi's motion for a directed verdict on the
ground that the evidence against Parodi was insufficient. Id. at 773, 787. The Fourth Circuit
found that the evidence was sufficient to convict Parodi. See id. at 787-90. Defendant Conway
contended that the trial court erred by admitting testimony of meetings between Conway and
another coconspirator as well as the trial court's admission of photographs the DEA took of
Conway and the coconspirator. Id. at 773, 790. The Fourth Circuit found that both the testimony
and photographs were admissible. See id. at 790. Defendant Laws contended that the trial court
erred by admitting a tape recording of telephone conversations between Laws and a coconspirator.
Id. at 773, 790. The Parodicourt found that the tape recording was admissible. See id. at 790.
14. See supra note 13 (discussing defendants' contentions of error in Parodt).
15. 703 F.2d at 781.
16. See id. at 784. Larry Ozella, the prosecution's chief witness, was a coconspirator in
the cocaine conspiracy for which the government charged Parodi, Conway, and Laws. Id. at 777.
The federal authorities did not charge Ozella with conspiracy to distribute cocaine, nor was Ozella
the subject of any federal investigation. See id. at 777, 784. Ozella, however, was in custody
pending prosecution in state court for his part in the conspiracy. Id. at 784. While in custody,
Ozella solicited an interview with an investigating DEA agent, in which Ozella confessed his guilt
both to the violation of the state statute for which the state already had indicted Ozella and
to possible federal charges. Id. at 777, 784. Ozella, however, did not plead guilty in the state
prosecution. Id. at 777. On advice of counsel, Ozella solicited the interview with the DEA agent
in order to obtain a "deal." Id. at 784. Although the agent refused to offer Ozella leniency
or immunity in any possible future federal prosecution, Ozella nevertheless confessed his guilt
to the agent and detailed his own involvement in the conspiracy. Id. In the course of his interviews with the agent, Ozella also implicated Parodi in the narcotics operation. See id. at 774-76.

1984]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

detailed his own involvement in the conspiracy and also implicated Parodi. 17
On cross-examination, Parodi's counsel impeached Ozella by suggesting that
Ozella's testimony at trial differed from the statement Ozella made to the DEA
agent during Ozella's pretrial interview."8 On rebuttal, the government introduced the DEA agent who testified detailing Ozella's prior consistent
*tatements. 9 The government offered the agent's testimony to rebut the defense
counsel's suggestions that Ozella's pretrial statements differed from Ozella's
testimony. 20 When the government first offered the agent's testimony, Parodi's
counsel objected, contending that the agent's testimony was hearsay.2" The
trial court, however, ruled that the agent's testimony was admissible only to
corroborate Ozella and instructed the jury to consider Ozella's prior consistent statements solely for the purpose of evaluating Ozella's credibility.2 2 On
appeal, Parodi contended that Ozella's prior consistent statements were inadmissible to corroborate Ozella because Ozella had a motive to fabricate before
he made the prior consistent statements. 23 Parodi contended that Ozella had
a motive to falsify his pretrial statements because Ozella hoped that the DEA
agent would inform the state court in which Ozella faced narcotic charges
that he was cooperating with the DEA. 24 At no time during the trial, however,

did Parodi object to the DEA agent's testimony of Ozella's prior consistent
statements on the ground that Ozella had a motive to fabricate before he made

the prior consistent statements. 25

On appeal, the Parodicourt affirmed Parodi's conviction and found three

grounds upon which to reject Parodi's contention that Ozella's prior consistent statements were inadmissible.2 6 First, the Fourth Circuit found that because
Parodi failed to object at trial on the grounds he asserted on appeal, Parodi
waived his right to object to the trial court's admission of Ozella's prior consistent statements. 27 Second, the Fourth Circuit found that the evidence of
17. See id. at 781-83.
18. See id. at 781.

19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. When the DEA agent first testified detailing the statements Ozella made during
the pretrial interview, Parodi objected to the agent's testimony of Ozella's prior consistent statements
on the ground that Ozella's statements constituted statements a coconspirator made after the
date of the alleged conspiracy. Id. Parodi maintained that the statements Ozella made after the
conspiracy were not in furtherance of the conspiracy and thus were hearsay. Id. The government
responded to Parodi's objection by contending that it offered Ozella's prior consistent statements
to rehabilitate Ozella and not substantively to prove the truth of Ozella's statements. See id.
22. See id. at 782.
23. See id. Ozella conceded on cross-examination that he hoped that the DEA agent would
tell the state court in which Ozella faced narcotics charges that Ozella was cooperating with the
DEA. See id. at 784.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 782.
26. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's rejection of
Parodi's objection to trial court's admission of Ozella's prior consistent statements).
27. See 703 F.2d at 783. Because Parodi failed to object at trial to the admission of Ozella's
prior consistent statements on the ground that Ozella made the statements while motivated to
fabricate, the Fourth Circuit found that Parodi did not preserve his objection for appeal under
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Ozella's motive to fabricate was probably too insubstantial to render Ozella's

prior consistent statements inadmissible. 28 The Parodicourt found no need
to determine whether the evidence of Ozella's motive to falsify was insubstantial because the court determined that Ozella's prior consistent statements were
admissible for a third reason.2 9 The Fourth Circuit held that prior consistent
statements of an allegedly impeached witness are admissible to corroborate
the witness regardless of whether the witness had a motive to fabricate the
prior statements.3"
The Fourth Circuit recognized that circuit courts are split over whether
rule 801(d)(1)(B) impliedly conditions the admissibility of prior consistent
statements as rehabilitative evidence on the absence of a motive to fabricate
the prior statements. 3' The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if the drafters of rule
801(d)(1)(B) had intended to include the absence of a motive to fabricate as
a condition for admissibility, the drafters would have added the condition
to the rule.32 The Parodicourt, however, conceded that some courts have read
such a condition into the rule. 3 The Fourth Circuit identified United States
v. Quinto34 as the leading case supporting the view that a witness must make
a prior consistent statement before the witness has developed a motive to
fabricate in order for the prior statement to be admissible as rehabilitative
evidence. 35 According to the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit in Quinto concluded that under traditional evidentiary law, prior consistent statements that
a witness made after the witness had a motive to fabricate were admissible
neither for substantive nor for rehabilitative use. 36 Since rule 801(d)(1)(B) does
not alter the traditional standard for admissibility of prior consistent statements,
the Quinto court reasoned that the rule also renders a declarant's statements
that postdate the declarant's motive to falsify inadmissible. 37 The Fourth Cirrule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See id.; see also FED. R. EvwD. 103. Rule 103 requires
that in order to preserve an objection for appellate review, the objection must be specific, timely,
and of record. See id.
28. See 703 F.2d at 784. The Parodi court speculated that Ozella's mere hope that the
DEA agent would inform the state court in which Ozella faced narcotics charges that Ozella
cooperated with the DEA was insufficient to prove that Ozella had a motive to fabricate and
thus insufficient to render Ozella's prior consistent statements inadmissible. See id.; see also supra
notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing Ozella's motive to fabricate prior consistent
statements).
29. See 703 F.2d at 784; see also infra text accompanying note 30 (discussing Parodi).
30. See 703 F.2d at 784.
31. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing split of authority on issue of
whether rule 801(d)(1)(B) conditions admissibility of witness' prior consistent statements on absence
of motive to fabricate).
32. See 703 F.2d at 784.
33. See id.; see also infra notes 34-37 & 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing circuit
courts that interpret rule 801(d)(1)(B) as excluding witness' prior consistent statements that postdate
witness' motive to fabricate).
34. 582 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1978).
35. See 703 F.2d at 784-85 (discussing Quinto); infra notes 47-48, 80-83 & 91 and accompanying text (same).
36. See 703 F.2d at 784-85 (discussing Quinto); infra notes 47-48, 80-83 & 91 and accompanying text (same).
37. See 703 F.2d at 784-85 (discussing Quinto); infra notes 47-48, 80-83 & 91 and accom-
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cuit found that the Quinto court's discussion of prior consistent statements
as rehabilitative evidence was dictum because the government in Quinto offered a witness' prior consistent statements for substantive, rather than for
rehabilitative use. " Additionally, the Fourth Circuit rejected the Quinto court's
rationale and followed another line of case authority that held, contrary to
Quinto, that neither traditional evidentiary law nor rule 801(d)(1)(B) conditioned the admissibility of prior consistent statements on the declarant's lack
39
of a motive to falsify the prior statement.
In rejecting the Quinto court's rationale, the Fourth Circuit placed particular reliance on Judge Friendly's concurring opinion in the Second Circuit
case of United States v. Rubin." ° Judge Friendly concluded that, contrary to
panying text (same).
38. See 703 F.2d at 784-86 (discussing Quinto). The Fourth Circuit and Judge Friendly
in his concurrence in United States v. Rubin concluded that the Second Circuit's discussion in
United States v. Quinto of the rehabilitative use of prior consistent statements was dictum. See
id.; United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring), aff'd,
449 U.S. 424 (1981). The Fourth Circuit and Judge Friendly in his Rubin concurrence determined
that the government in Quinto offered a witness' prior consistent statements solely for substantive use. See 703 F.2d at 784-86; 609 F.2d at 68-69 (Friendly, J., concurring). An analysis of
the record of the trial court's decision in Quinto reveals that the trial court admitted a witness'
prior consistent statements as both substantive and rehabilitative evidence. See United States v.
Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 227-32 (2d Cir. 1978). The trial court in Quinto convicted the defendant,
Quinto, of tax fraud and the Second Circuit reversed the conviction. See id. at 224-25. The government's key witness in Quinto was an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent who testified that
Quinto had incriminated himself during a pretrial investigatory interview with several IRS agents.
See id. at 227-29. The IRS agents had prepared a memorandum of their interview with Quinto
detailing Quinto's incriminating remarks. See id. at 229. The defense counsel cross-examined
the IRS agent in an attempt to show that the IRS agents had conducted the pretrial interview
as an inquisition rather than as an interview and that the IRS investigation of Quinto's financial
affairs was inadequate. See id. at 227-28. The government in Quinto argued that the defense
counsel impliedly had attacked the agent's credibility and that the memorandum, therefore, was
admissible as both substantive and rehabilitative evidence. See id. at 229. The trial judge refused
to admit the memorandum as the agent's prior consistent statement during the prosecution's redirect
examination of the agent because the trial judge did not believe that the defense counsel had
attacked the agent's credibility. See id. The trial judge, however, left open the possibility that
he would admit the agent's prior consistent statement if defense counsel subsequently attacked
the agent's credibility. See id. Later in the trial after the defense counsel had presented several
witnesses who contradicted the agent's testimony, the trial judge reconsidered his refusal to admit
the memorandum as a prior consistent statement and subsequently allowed the prosecution to
distribute copies of the memorandum to the jury to consider during their deliberations. See id.
at 231-32. The trial judge admitted the memorandum as both substantive and rehabilitative evidence
after the defense presented its case bedause the defense counsel's line of argument convinced
the trial judge that the defense counsel had attacked the agent's credibility. See id. Thus, the
Second Circuit's discussion of the rehabilitative use of prior consistent statements was not dictum. See id. at 227-32. Cases that the Second Circuit decided after Quinto indicate that the Second Circuit regards the Quinto discussion of the rehabilitative use of prior consistent statements
as binding legal precedent. See United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 392-93 (2d Cir. 1980)
(following Quinto); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 61-63 (2d Cir. 1979) (following Quinto),
aff'd, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
39. See 703 F.2d at 785 (citing United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1349 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981);
United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1121-22 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977));
infra notes 54, 56 & 60 (discussing Parry, Rios, and Scholle respectively).
40. See 703 F.2d at 785-86 (citing Judge Friendly's concurrence in Rubin); see also United
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Quinto, courts considering the admissibility of prior consistent statements
before the adoption of rule 801(d)(1)(B) followed a flexible rule that gave trial
judges latitude to admit prior consistent statements to rehabilitate a witness,
provided that the trial judge charged the jury to consider the prior consistent
statement only to evaluate the witness' credibility." The Fourth Circuit found
States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring), aff'd, 449 U.S.
424 (1981). The district court in United States v. Rubin convicted the defendant of mail, wire,
and securities fraud. See 609 F.2d at 53-54. The government conducted a pre-indictment interview with the defendant in which government agents took notes of the defendant's remarks. See
id. at 57-58. One of the agents present at the interview testified at trial that the defendant incriminated himself during the pretrial interview. See id. On cross-examination, the defense counsel
quoted from the notes to show that the witness' testimony was inconsistent with the notes. See
id. On rebuttal, the government offered the notes as prior consistent statements to rehabilitate
the witness by showing that the witness' testimony was consistent with the notes. See id. at 58-59.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the notes were inadmissible as rehabilitative prior consistent statements under Quinto because the witness had a motive to fabricate when he made the
notes. See id. at 61. The Rubin majority found Quinto to be controlling law in the Second Circuit
but nevertheless affirmed the defendant's conviction. See id. at 62-63. The Rubin majority determined that the defendant had waived his right to object to the admission of the notes on appeal
because the defendant failed to object at trial to the admission of the notes on the grounds that
the witness had a motive to fabricate the notes. See id. Judge Friendly, concurring in Rubin,
took issue with the majority's deference to Quinto and found that the Quinto court's discussion
of the admissibility of prior consistent statements as rehabilitative evidence was merely dictum.
See id. at 69 (Friendly, J., concurring); see also supra note 38 (discussing Judge Friendly's discussion of Quinto). Judge Friendly also disagreed with the Quinto court's conclusion that rule
801(d)(1)(B) conditions the admissibility of a witness' prior consistent statements as corroborative
evidence on the witness' lack of motive to fabricate the prior statements. See 609 F.2d at 66-70
(Friendly, J., concurring); see also infra notes 41 & 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing
Judge Friendly's interpretation of rule 801(d)(1)(B)).
41. See 609 F.2d at 68 (Friendly, J., concurring). Judge Friendly found that rule 801(d)(1)(B)
applies only to prior consistent statements used as substantive evidence and does not affect prior
consistent statements offered as rehabilitative evidence. See id. at 69; see also supra notes 4-5
and accompanying text (discussing distinction between substantive and rehabilitative use of prior
consistent statements). Judge Friendly noted that rule 801(d)(1)(B) establishes that prior consistent statements are not hearsay if the statements meet the conditions set forth in the rule. See
609 F.2d at 69 (Friendly, J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 7-8 (discussing
rule 801(d)(1)(B)). Judge Friendly stated that prior consistent statements offered as rehabilitative
evidence are never hearsay because the proponent does not offer the statements to prove the
truth of the matter asserted but only to prove the fact that the witness made the statements.
See 609 F.2d at 69 (Friendly, J., concurring); see also supra note 6 (discussing FED. R. EVID.
801 advisory committee note (subsection (d)(l)(B)). Judge Friendly argued that because courts
never considered prior consistent statements offered as rehabilitative evidence to be hearsay, the
Quinto court's position that rule 801(d)(1)(B) applies to such statements is counterintuitive. See
609 F.2d at 69-70 (Friendly, J., concurring). While the Fourth Circuit in Parodicited in a footnote Judge Friendly's conclusion that rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not apply to prior consistent statements
offered as rehabilitative evidence, the Fourth Circuit did not adopt Judge Friendly's rationale.
See 703 F.2d at 785-86 & 785 n.13. The Parodi court stated that rule 801(d)(1)(B) sets forth
two conditions for the admissibility of prior consistent statements to rehabilitate a witness. See
id. at 784. The Fourth Circuit stated that for a prior consistent statement to be admissible for
the limited purpose of rehabilitating a witness, rule 801(d)(1)(B) requires that the prior statement
must be consistent with the witness' in-court testimony and the proponent must offer the statement to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive
against the witness. See id. The Parodicourt merely agreed with Judge Friendly's determination
that traditional evidentiary law prior to the adoption of rule 801(d)(1)(B) was flexible and gave
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that even the courts that seemed to follow the Quinto court's reasoning actually
applied a more flexible standard and have upheld the admission of prior consistent statements a witness made with a motive to fabricate. 42 Additionally,

the Fourth Circuit rejected Parodi's contention that prior Fourth Circuit law
court to follow the Quinto court's interpretation of rule
compelled the
43

801(d)(1)(B).
The split of authority on the issue of whether rule 801 (d)(1)(B) requires that
a witness' prior consistent statements must predate the witness' motive to fabricate
to be admissible centers primarily on the state of evidentiary law prior to the adoption of rule 801 (d)(1)(B)." Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not alter the traditional conditions under which prior consistent statements were admissible to rehabilitate a
witness but merely allows counsel to use prior consistent statements that meet
the traditional conditions for admissibility for substantive as well as rehabilitative
purposes."' Thus, the traditional conditions for admissibility continue to govern
which prior consistent statements are admissible as corroborative evidence.", The
Second Circuit in Quinto concluded that under traditional evidentiarylaw, courts
generally excluded a witness' prior consistent statements automatically if the
witness had a motive to falsify the prior statements. 47 The Quinto court determined, therefore, that under rule 801(d)(1)(B) such statements remain inadmissible." On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit in Parodiand Judge Friendly
in his Rubin concurrence found that prior to the adoption of rule 801(d)(1)(B),
courts generally had applied a more flexible standard that allowed trial judges
discretion to admit prior consistent statements even when the witness had a motive
to fabricate the prior statements. 9 The Parodicourt and Judge Friendly found
that under rule 801(d)(1)(B), prior consistent statements are admissible on a flex-

trial judges latitude to admit prior consistent statements to rehabilitate a witness even when the
witness had a motive to fabricate the prior statement. See id. at 786; 609 F.2d at 68 (Friendly,
J., concurring). The Fourth Circuit adopted Judge Friendly's position that courts interpreting
rule 801(d)(l)(B) also should apply a flexible standard. See 703 F.2d at 786; 609 F.2d at 68-70
(Friendly, J., concurring).
42. See 702 F.2d at 786-87 (citing United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 672-73 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967
(1979); see also infra notes 57 & 59 and accompanying text (discussing Sampol and Baron).
43. See 703 F.2d at 787 (citing United States v. Weil, 561 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1977)); see
also infra notes 61-77 and accompanying text (discussing Weil and other relevant Fourth Circuit
cases).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37 & 41 (comparing Quinto court's and Judge
Friendly's findings regarding evidentiary law prior to adoption of rule 801(d)(1)(B)); infra text
accompanying notes 47-50 (comparing Quinto with Parodi).
45. See Rubin, 609 F.2d at 69 (Friendly, J., concurring) (prior consistent statements that
were traditionally admissible only for rehabilitation now admissible for general use under rule
801(d)(1)(B)); FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee note (subsection (d)(1)(B)) (same) supra
text accompanying notes 4-8 (discussing rule 801(d)(1)(B)); see also FEDEML RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL, supra note 8, at 499 (prior consistent statements admissible at common law to rebut
express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper motive).
46. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing effect of rule 801(d)(1)(B) on traditional standards for admissibility of prior consistent statements).
47. See Quinto, 582 F.2d at 232-33.
48. See id. at 233.
49. See Parodi, 703 F.2d at 768, 786; Rubin, 609 F.2d at 68 (Friendly, J.,concurring).
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ible basis for purposes of rehabilitating an impeached witness. ° Neither the Quinto
court nor the Parodicourt's historical conclusions are entirely correct.5 ' Evidentiary law prior to the adoption of rule 801(d)(1)(B) was split on the issue of whether
a witness' prior consistent statements made while the witness had a motive to
fabricate were admissible to rehabilitate the witness. 2 The circuit court decision
following the adoption of rule 801(d)(1)(B) are similarly split5 3The Fifth, 4 Sixth,"
50. See Parodi, 703 F.2d at 786; Rubin, 609 F.2d at 69-70 (Friendly, J., concurring). The
Parodicourt did not state expressly that prior consistent statements are admissible under rule
801(d)(1)(B) on a flexible basis that gives trial judges latitude to admit prior statements to rehabilitate
a witness. See 703 F.2d at 785-87. While the Fourth Circuit did not accept Judge Friendly's Rubin
concurrence in its entirety, the Parodi court did find that Judge Friendly outlined the proper
standard for the admissibility of prior consistent statements as rehabilitative evidence. See id.
at 786; see also supra note 41 (discussing Fourth Circuit's disagreement with Judge Friendly's
position that rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not apply to rehabilitative use of prior consistent statements).
Judge Friendly found that trial courts should admit witness' prior consistent statements on a
flexible basis to rehabilitate a witness, notwithstanding the witness' motive to fabricate the prior
statement. See Rubin, 609 F.2d at 69-70 (Friendly, J., concurring).
51. See infra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing state of traditional evidentiary
law concerning admissibility of prior consistent statements).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Bentley, 503 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (impeached witness' prior consistent statement admissible to rehabilitate witness even though prior
statement postdated witness' arrest); United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134, 1134-35 (5th Cir.
1972) (per curiam) (witness' prior consistent statement admissible even though witness had motive
to fabricate prior statement); United States v. Bays, 448 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir.) (per curiam)
(witness made prior consistent statement while witness had motive to fabricate but prior statement had probative value and thus was admissible), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 957 (1971); United
States v. DeLa Motte, 434 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir.) (opposing counsel's allegation that witness
made prior consistent statement with motive to fabricate insufficient to render witness' prior
statement inadmissible), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1970); United States v. Alexander, 430 F.2d
904, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (prior consistent statements admissible at trial judge's
discretion). But see, e.g., United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068, 1082 (7th Cir.) (prior consistent
statements that witness made before witness had motive to fabricate are admissible at judge's
discretion), cert. denied, 420 U.S 909 (1974); United States v. Rodriquez, 452 F.2d 1146, 1148
(9th Cir. 1972) (prior consistent statements admissible since prior statement predated witness'
motive to fabricate); Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir.) (prior consistent
statement admissible to rebut charge of recent fabrication only if witness made prior statement
before alleged fabrication), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970); United States v. Fayette, 388 F.2d
728, 733 (2d Cir. 1968) (court approved of case holding prior consistent statement inadmissible
because witness made prior statement while motivated to fabricate); United States v. Potash,
118 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.) (prior consistent statement witness made after witness motivated to
fabricate was inadmissible), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 584 (1941). The admissibility of prior consistent statements defies analysis primarily because courts have refused to follow precedent both
within and without their own jurisdictions, producing an irreconcilable conflict in the decisions.
See Graham, supra note 3, at 576.
53. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing split of authority).
54. See United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1981) (prior consistent statement admissible even though witness made prior statement while motivated to fabricate); United
States v. Cifarelli, 589 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1979) (prior consistent statements need not predate
witness' motive to fabricate to be admissible); United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284, 289 (5th
Cir. 1978) (prior consistent statement witness made while motivated to fabricate held admissible).
55. See United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982) (rejecting Quinto
holding, finding prior consistent statement admissible under rule 801(d)(1)(B) even though witness
had motive to fabricate prior statement), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 753 (1983).
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Tenth, 6 and District of Columbia Circuits 5" support the Fourth Circuit's position that a witness' prior consistent statements are not inadmissible under rule
801(d)(1)(B) simply because the witness had a motive to fabricate the prior
statements. On the other hand, the Third Circuit supports the Second Circuit's
holding in Quinto that a witness' prior consistent statements are inadmissible under
rule 801(d)(1)(B) if the witness madethe prior statements at atime whenthe witness
had a motive to fabricate.' 8 The Seventh 59 and Eighth Circuits"0 are split on the
issue.

56. See United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1348-49 (10th Cir. 1979) (witness' prior consistent statement admissible even though witness' prior inconsistent statement predated witness'
prior consistent statement), rev'd on other grounds, 637 F.2d 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 452
U.S 918 (1980).
57. See United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 670-74 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The
Parodi court cited United States v. Sampol as an example of a case in which the court seemed
to defer to precedent that requires the exclusion of prior consistent statements a witness made
with a motive to fabricate, but in which the court actually applied a more flexible standard.
See 703 F.2d at 787. The Sampol court found that the admissibility of a witness' prior consistent
statement turned on whether the witness had a motive to lie when the witness made the prior
statement. 636 F.2d at 672. Although the Sampol court concluded that the witness in Sampol
had no motive to fabricate when the witness made the prior consistent statement, the court determined that, irrespective of the witness' alleged motive to fabricate, the defense counsel's introduction
of the witness' prior inconsistent statement to impeach the witness entitled the government to
introduce the witness' prior consistent statement to rehabilitate the witness under rule 801(d)(l)(B).
See id. at 671-73.
58. See United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1001-02 (3d Cir.) (witness' prior consistent statement admissible since prior statement predated witness' motive to fabricate), cert. denied,
449 U.S 899 (1980).
59. See United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir. 1979) (witness' prior consistent statement inadmissible since prior statement would not rebut charge of improper motive
that existed before witness made prior consistent statement); United States v. McPartlin, 595
F.2d 1321, 1351-52 (7th Cir. 1978) (prior consistent statement witness made after witness had
motive to fabricate inadmissible under rule 801(d)(l)(B)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979). But
see United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1250-53 (7th Cir.) (prior consistent statement witness
made after witness allegedly had motive to fabricate admissible), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979).
The Parodicourt cited United States v. Baron as an example of a case in which the court seemed
to follow Quinto but actually applied a more flexible standard. See 703 F.2d at 786. The defendant in Baron attacked the trial court's admission of an impeached witness' prior consistent
statements to rehabilitate the witness on the ground that the witness' prior statements were inadmissible under Quinto because the witness had a motive to fabricate the prior statement. See
602 F.2d at 1251-53; see also supranotes 36-37 &47-48 and accompanying text (discussing Quinto).
The Baron court upheld the trial court's admission of the prior consistent statements and found
that Quinto was not controlling primarily because, unlike the situation in Quinto, the defendant
in Baron had impeached the witness with a prior inconsistent statement by using the same written
record of the witness' prior statements as the government used to rehabilitate the witness. See
602 F.2d at 1253 n.8. Additionally, the Baron court stated that whether or not the witness' motive
to fabricate existed at the time the witness made the prior consistent statement was a fact question
for the jury. Id.; United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 321-22 (7th Cir. 1977) (prior consistent
statement witness made after witness had motive to fabricate admissible on rebuttal to rehabilitate
impeached witness).
60. See United States v. Lanier, 578 F.2d 1246, 1256 (8th Cir.) (witness' prior consistent
statement admissible because witness' motive to fabricate predated witness' prior consistent statement), cert. denied, 439 U.S 856 (1978). But see United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1122
(8th Cir.) (witness' prior consistent statement need not predate witness' prior inconsistent statement to be admissible), cert. denied, 434 U.S 940 (1977).
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The Fourth Circuit cases decided before the adoption of rule 801(d)(1)(B)
are also split regarding whether prior consistent statements a witness made while
the witness had a motive to fabricate are admissible as rehabilitative evidence. 6"
Fourth Circuit cases following the adoption of the rule, however, implicitly support the Parodicourt's holding that rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not condition the admissibility of a witness' prior consistent statements on the absence of a motive
to fabricate.62 The Parodicourt rejected Parodi's contention that Fourth Circuit
precedent as embodied in UnitedStates v. Wei13 compelled the court to construe
rule 801(d)(1)(B) as unconditionally excluding a witness' prior consistent
statements that postdate the witness' motive to fabricate." The Fourth Circuit
in Weil affirmed a defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting the passing of
counterfeit money, finding that the trial court's admission of a witness' prior consistent statement on redirect examination as corroborative evidence was harmless
error. 65 Although the defendant in Well alleged on cross-examination that the
government had promised the witness leniency if the witness implicated the defendant, the Parodicourt correctly found that the Well defendant did not object
to the witness' prior consistent statement on the ground that the witness has a
motive to fabricate. 66 Rather, the Weil defendant maintained that the witness'
61. See United States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d 1069, 1073 (4th Cir.) (extent to which trial judge
should admit witness' prior consistent statements to corroborate witness is matter within sound
discretion of trial judge), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1970); United States v. Leggett, 312 F.2d
566, 572 (4th Cir.) (although prior consistent statements generally are inadmissible to corroborate
witness bedause witness may have fabricated prior statement, such statements are admissible when
opposing counsel alleges witness fabricated testimony or introduces prior inconsistent statement
to impeach witness), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 955 (1964); Beaty v. United States, 203 F.2d 652,
656 (4th Cir. 1953) (admissibility of witness' prior consistent statements is within trial judge's
discretion and jury is able to determine whether prior statements corroborate witness), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 946 (1955); Goins v. United States, 99 F.2d 147, 150-51 (4th Cir.) (jury is as capable
of evaluating truth of witness' statements as is trial judge), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 622 (1938).
But see Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 1931) (to be admissible to corroborate
a witness, witness' prior consistent statements must predate witness' alleged motive to fabricate).
62. See infra notes 63-78 and accompanying text (discussing post-rule 801(d)(1)(B) Fourth
Circuit cases).
63. 561 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
64. See Parodi, 703 F.2d at 787.
65. See 561 F.2d at 1111. The trial judge in United States v. Weil admitted a witness' prior
consistent statement on direct examination of the witness as well as on redirect examination.
See id. at 1110. The Weil court found that the trial judge erred by admitting the witness' prior
consistent statement on direct and redirect examination because the defendant had not impeachedthe witness first. Id. at 1111; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing rule
801(d)(1)(B)). The Weil court, however, found that since the defendant failed to object to the
admission of the witness' prior consistent statement on direct examination, the trial judge's error
in admitting the witness' statement on redirect examination was harmless. See 561 F.2d at 1111.
The Weil court reasoned that any prejudice to the defendant occurred when the trial judge admitted the witness' statement on direct examination. See id. Furthermore, the Weil court found that
because the defendant failed to object to the trial judge's admission of the witness' prior consistent statement on direct examination, the defendant waived the right to object on appeal. See
id. at 1111 n.3; see also supra note 27 (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 103's requirement
that counsel's objection must be specific, timely, and of record to preserve objection for appeal).
66. See 703 F.2d at 787; 561 F.2d at 1110-11. The government's chief witness in Well was
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prior consistent statement was inadmissible to corroborate the witness because
the defendant had not impeached the witness first.6" The Weil court, however,
stated in dictum that in the absence of certain kinds of impeaching testimony,
a witness' prior consistent statements made subsequent to the origin of the witness'
motive to fabricate lack probative value. 8 The Weil court thus implies that in
the presence of certain kinds of impeaching testimony, such statements in fact
possess probative value.69 The Well court also noted that courts object to prior
consistent statements a witness made after the witness had a motive to fabricate
not because the statements lack probative value but rather because the statements
constitute hearsay.7" The Weil court apparently criticized those courts that deem
prior consistent statements to be hearsay, by quoting rule 801(d)(1)(B) to the effect that a witness' prior consistent statement is not hearsay if the proponent offers the statement to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or
improper motive.7 '
The Parodi court found that another Fourth Circuit case, United States
v. Dominguez,"2 provided a closer analogy to the case at hand. 7 3 The government's key witness in Dominguez cooperated with the government to obtain
a reward for the capture of certain smugglers.7" The defense counsel impeached
the government witness on cross-examination by implying that the witness'
desire to obtain a reward motivated the witness to falsify his testimony.7 5 The
trial judge in Dominguez admitted the witness' prior consistent statements to
rehabilitate the witness over defense counsel's objection that the witness' prior
consistent statements were inadmissible hearsay under Weil.76 Although the
witness' desire to obtain a reward predated the witness' prior consistent
the defendant's brother who was present at the shopping center where the defendant passed
counterfeit bills. See 561 F.2d at 1110. The police arrested both the witness and the defendant
and the witness gave a statement to the police in which he implicated the defendant. See id.
The defendant in Weil attempted to show on cross-examination of the witness that the government promised the witness leniency if the witness implicated the defendant. See id. at 1I I1. Neither
the trial court nor the Fourth Circuit in Well apparently believed that the defendant's crossexamination of the witness constituted impeachment. See id.
67. See id. at 1110.
68. See id. at I I I I n.2. While the Weil court stated that in the absence of certain kinds
of impeaching testimony, a witness' prior consistent statements that postdate the witness' motive
to fabricate lack probative value, the Well court did not define the types of impeaching testimony
that must be absent in order to deprive a witness' prior consistent statements of probative value.
See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. 604 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1979).
73. See Parodi, 703 F.2d at 787.
74. See 604 F.2d at 310-11.
75. See id. at 310.
76. See id. at 311. The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Dominguez quoted rule 801(d)(1)[B]
to the effect that an impeached witness' prior consistent statement is not hearsay if the proponent
offers the statement to rebut opposing counsel's charge that the witness fabricated testimony.
See id.; see also supratext accompanying notes 7-8 (discussing rule 801(d)(1)(B)). While the Dominguez court determined that its admission of a witness' prior consistent statements was consis-
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statements, the Dominguez court upheld the trial court's admission of the prior
7
consistent statements, finding that its holding was consistent with Weil."
While Weil and Dominguez implicitly support the Parodi court's interpretation of rule 801(d)(1)(B), neither the Weil nor Dominguez court opinions
expressly state that rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not condition the admissibility of
a witness' prior consistent statements on the absence of a motive to fabricate. 78
Since the case law among other circuits is split on the issue of whether rule
801(d)(1)(B) renders a witness' prior consistent statements inadmissible as corroborative evidence if the witness had a motive to fabricate the prior
statements, 79 the question that remains is whether the Parodi court followed
the better reasoned line of authority. The Fourth Circuit rejected the Quinto
court's rationale that prior consistent statements a witness made after the
witness had a motive to fabricate are inadmissible as corroborative evidence
because the prior statements are not relevant to the issue of the witness'
credibility." The Quinto court reasoned that only when the witness' prior statement predates the witness' alleged motive to fabricate does the prior statement tend to make the trustworthiness of the witness' testimony more
probable.' According to the Quinto court, when the witness' prior consistent
statement predates the witness' alleged motive to fabricate, the fact that the
prior statement is consistent with the testimony implies 2 that the witness'
testimony was free of the alleged discrediting influence.
Under the Quinto interpretation of rule 801(d)(1)(B), an opposing counsel's
mere allegation that a witness had reason to lie when the witness made the
prior statement renders the prior consistent statement inadmissible to corroborate the witness. 3 The better view is that an opposing counsel's mere
tent with Fourth Circuit precedent as embodied in the Weil holding, the Dominguez court did
not elaborate on why its holding was consistent with Well. See 604 F.2d at 311.
77. See 604 F.2d at 310-12. The defendant in Dominguez did not attack the trial court's
admission of the witness' prior consistent statement on the ground that the witness' motive to
fabricate predated the witness' statement, nor did the Dominguez court address whether the witness
had a motive to falsify the prior consistent statement. See id. The witness in Dominguez, however,
gave his prior consistent statement to the authorities after the witness began cooperating with
the government in hope of a reward. See id. at 310-11. Therefore, the witness' desire to obtain
a reward, which constituted his alleged improper motive, colored the witness' consistent statement as well as his testimony. See id.
78. See Well, 561 F.2d at 1110-12; Dominguez, 604 F.2d at 310-12; supra notes 65-77 and
accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing split of authority on question
of whether rule 801(d)(1)(B) requires that witness' prior consistent statements must predate witness'
motive to fabricate to be admissible).
80. See United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 232-33 (2d Cir. 1978); supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing Parodi court's rejection of Quinto).
81. See 582 F.2d at 233.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 233-34. The Second Circuit in Quinto did not find that the impeached witness
actually had a motive to fabricate his prior consistent statement. See id. at 234. Rather, the Quinto court held that the witness' prior consistent statement was inadmissible because the government did not prove that the witness made the prior statement before the witness' alleged improper motive arose. See id. The Quinto court found that rule 801(d)(1)(B) requires the propo-
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assertion that the witness' motive to fabricate predated the witness' prior consistent statement is insufficient to render the witness' prior consistent statement inadmissible as a matter of law. 4 Otherwise, the witness' proponent could
never rehabilitate the witness with a prior consistent statement in cases in which
a theoretical possibility existed that the witness falsified the prior statement. 8
The Parodicourt, however, did not contend merely that opposing counsel's
allegation that a witness had a motive to fabricate the prior consistent statement is insufficient to render the prior statement inadmissible." The Parodi
court took the position that even if a witness in fact had a motive to fabricate
his prior consistent statement, the statement is not inadmissible automatically
under rule 801(d)(1)(B).7 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
rule 801(d)(1)(B) is consistent with the spirit of the rule.88 The drafters of rule
801(d)(1)(B) stated that if opposing counsel wishes to open the door for the
admission of prior consistent statements into evidence, no sound reason is
apparent why the trial judge should not admit the statement generally. 8 9 Con-

trary to the Quinto court's assertion, when opposing counsel attacks a witness'
veracity, the witness' prior consistent statements and the circumstances under
nent of a witness' prior consistent statement to demonstrate to the trial judge's satisfaction either
that the witness had no motive to fabricate or that the witness' prior consistent statement predated
the witness' alleged improper motive. See id.
84. See United States v. DeLaMotte, 434 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir.) (if defendant's mere contention that witness had motive to fabricate prior consistent statement was sufficient to render
prior statement inadmissible, prosecution could never rehabilitate witness with prior consistent
statement when theoretical possibility existed that witness had motive to lie before witness made
prior statement), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1970); United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556,
566 (2d Cir.) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); see also J. WEINsTaEIN & M.
BERGER, 3 WSENST IN's EVIDENCE
607[08] at 607-95-96 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1982) Weinstein
agreed with Judge Friendly's concurring opinion in Rubin that prior to the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, courts used a flexible approach in determining the admissibility of prior consistent statements as rehabilitative evidence. See id; see also supra text accompanying note 41
(discussing Judge Friendly's Rubin concurrence). Weinstein also states that since the drafters of
the Federal Rules of Evidence intended to expand rather than contract the admissibility of evidence,
Judge Friendly's flexible approach to the admissibility of prior consistent statements seems a
more sensitive and useful reading of rule 801(d)(l)(B) than the Quinto court's interpretation of
the rule. See 3 WmNsmrE's EVIDENCE, supra,at 607-96; see also supra note 41 and accompanying
text (discussing Judge Friendly's Rubin concurrence); supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text
(discussing Quinto); infra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing Quinto). But see McCoRlCK, supra note 5, at 105 (prior consistent statement irrelevant to refute opposing counsel's
charge that witness falsified testimony unless witness made prior statement before witness' motive
to fabricate arose).
85. See supra note 84 (discussing DeLaMotte and Grunewald).
86. See infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing ParodO.
87. See Parodi, 703 F.2d at 784. The Parodi court held that Ozella's prior consistent
statements were admissible irrespective of whether a motive to fabricate existed on Ozella's part.
See id. The Fourth Circuit also found that under rule 801(d)(1)(B) as well as under traditional
evidentiary law, "the existence" of a motive to fabricate when the witness made the prior consistent statement does not render the prior statement inadmissible to corroborate the witness. See
id. at 785.
88. See infra text accompanying note 89 (discussing intent of drafters of rule 801).
89. See FED. R. EviD. 801 advisory committee note (subsection (d)(1)(B)).
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which the witness made the prior statements are relevant to the jury's evaluation of the witness' credibility. 90
Under the Quinto interpretation of rule 801(d)(1)(B), a witness' prior consistent statements that postdate the witness' motive to fabricate are inadmissible, regardless of the method by which opposing counsel has impeached the
witness. 9' The Parodicourt, on the other hand, held that trial judges should
take a flexible approach in admitting a witness' prior consistent statements
as rehabilitative evidence. 9 The Parodi court's interpretation of rule
801(d)(1)(B) allows trial judges to admit a witness' prior consistent statements
in situations in which the witness' prior consistent statements are particularly
relevant to the jury's evaluation of the witness' credibility. 93 The method by
which opposing counsel has impeached the witness has considerable bearing
on whether the witness' prior consistent statements should be admissible to
answer the impeachment.94 When, as in Parodi,an opposing counsel has impeached a witness with an alleged prior inconsistent statement and the witness
responds that he did not make the inconsistent statement but rather asserts
that his pretrial statements were consistent with his testimony, proof of a prior
consistent statement assists the jury in determining whether the witness uttered
the alleged inconsistency. 9 Since the jury must determine whether the witness
90. See United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (when
opposing counsel puts witness' motive at issue, evidence of prior consistent statements and circumstances under which witness made statement is relevant to jury's evaluation of witness' motive
for making prior statement); United States v. Bays, 448 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir.) (per curiam)
(defendant thoroughly attacked witness' motive and veracity, thus prior consistent statements
witness made after witness' alleged improper motive originated had probative value that could
assist jury in evaluating witness' credibility), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 957 (1971). But see FEDER
RutLEs OF EvrDENCE MAUAL, supra note 8, at 105 (witness' prior consistent statements are probative and admissible if prior statements predate witness' motive to lie); Note, Hearsay Under
the Proposed FederalRules - A DiscretionaryApproach, 15 WAYNE -L. REV. 1077, 1092 (1969)
(witness' prior consistent statement that postdates witness' motive to falsify would not rebut opposing counsel's charge that witness fabricated testimony).
91. See Quinto, 582 F.2d at 232-35. The Quinto court held that a witness' prior consistent
statements are inadmissible to rehabilitate the witness under rule 801(d)(1)(B) if the witness made
the prior statements after the witness allegedly had a motive to lie, without addressing whether
the method by which opposing counsel impeached the witness had any bearing on the admissibility of the prior statements. See id.
92. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing Parodicourt's interpretation of
rule 801(d)(1)(B)).
93. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing when prior consistent statements
are particularly relevant to jury's evaluation of witness' credibility).
94. See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, at 103. McCormick states that the admissibility of an
impeached witness' prior consistent statement turns on whether the prior statement is logically
relevant to explain the impeaching evidence. See id. According to McCormick, to be admissible,
the rehabilitating evidence must meet opposing counsel's impeaching evidence directly. See id.
95. See supra text accompanying note 18 (discussing Parodi's impeachment of Ozella in
Parodi); Graham, supra note 3 at 599. Graham states that when a witness denies making an
alleged prior inconsistent statement and asserts that the prior statement was consistent with his
testimony, proof of the witness' prior consistent statement contradicts the extrinsic proof of the
offered inconsistent statement. See id.; see also WiG-oR,

4 WIGMORE ON EvDENcE § 1126, at

258-62 (Chadbourne Rev. 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1983); The Parodicourt adopted Judge Friendly's
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uttered the prior inconsistent statement to evaluate the witness' credibility,
times is relevant to the jury's conproof of the witness' consistency at other
6

sideration of the witness' credibility.9
In rejecting the Quinto court's interpretation of rule 801(d)(1)(B), the
Fourth Circuit in Parodi followed the better reasoned line of authority concerning the admissibility of prior consistent statements. 91 Rather than impose

a rigid prohibition on the admission of prior consistent statements a witness
made after the witness had a motive to lie, the Parodi court's mandate of
flexibility allows trial courts to admit prior consistent statements as rehabilitative
evidence when those statements help the jury to evaluate the witness'
credibility. 98 Since the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence designed the
rules to expand the admissibility of evidence, 99 Parodirepresents both a useful
reading of rule 801(d)(1)(B) and an appropriate rejection of the inflexible and
arbitrary exclusion of evidence.
SETH CALVEN PRAGER

B.

Permissible Judicial Commentary on a Defendant's Credibility

A federal judge in a criminal trial may comment on the credibility of
witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence.' Juries generally accord great

weight to a judge's comments that disclose his opinion on the merits of a
conclusion in Rubin that if opposing counsel uses some portions of a witness' prior statement
to impeach the witness, the principle of completeness as embodied in rule 106 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, requires that the court allow the proponent to use the same prior statement
to rehabilitate the witness. See Parodi, 703 F.2d at 786; Rubin, 609 F.2d at 70 (Friendly, J.,
concurring); FED. R. EvID. 106. Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that when
a party introduces a writing or recorded statement into evidence, the adverse party may require
the other party to introduce any other part of the writing or recorded statement which fairness
dictates the jury ought to consider contemporaneously with the initially introduced writing or
recorded statement. See id. Unlike the situation in Rubin in which the defendant quoted from
the witness' written memorandum to impeach the witness, Parodi quoted from Ozella's unrecorded
pretrial conversation with the DEA to impeach Ozella. Compare Rubin, 609 F.2d at 57-59 with
Parodi, 703 F.2d at 781-83 (comparing impeaching evidence). Federal Rule of Evidence 106 is
limited to writings and recorded statements and does not apply to conversations. See FED. R.
EviD. 106 advisory committee note.
96. See Graham, supra note 3, at 599 (discussing relevance of prior consistent statements).
97. See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text (discussing split of authority).
98. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing ParodO.
99. See supra note 84 (discussing Federal Rules of Evidence drafters' intent to expand admissibility of evidence). The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to secure fairness and
promote the growth and development of evidentiary law toward the end that courts may ascertain
the truth and determine litigation in a just fashion. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
I. See Gant v. United States, 506 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1974) (federal judges may comment fairly and impartially on weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses), cert. denied, 420
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case. 2 Allowing a judge unbridled discretion in using the privilege of commentary therefore creates the possibility of judicial usurpation of the jury's factfinding function. 3 The chances of judicial overreaching are particularly acute
U.S. 1005 (1975). If the trial judge comments on the evidence, the judge must instruct the jury
that they are not bound by his comments regarding the witness' credibility or evidentiary issues.
See 506 F.2d at 520; infra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing judge's instruction to jury
limiting effect of commentary). The federal practice permitting commentary derives from the
common-law notion of the authority and function of the judge during trial. See Herron v. Southern
Pacific Company, 283 U.S. 91, 95 (1931) (function and authority of federal trial judge patterned
after common-law courts). At common law, the judge was not simply a trial moderator, but
was an active participant in the trial proceeding. Id. See generally J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw, 185 (1898).
The common-law courts considered the power of judicial commentary to be an inherent part
of trial by jury. See Note, Evidence - Jury Trials - Weight of Evidence - Credibility of Witnesses
- JudicialComment Thereon, 27 N.D. L. REV. 199, 200 (1951). The purpose of judicial commentary has been to assist the jury in the factfinding process. See e.g., Moore v. United States, 598
F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1979) (federal judge may comment on facts adduced at trial for purposes
of clarification); United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 933 (6th Cir. 1979) (commentary by
judge often necessary to clarify complex issues for jury); United States v. Tourine, 428 F.2d
865, 869 (2d Cir. 1970) (federal trial judge empowered to assist jury in sorting out and drawing
infererices from evidence), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971). A federal judge generally has wide
discretion in determining when and how often he will advise the jury on the evidence introduced
at trial. See J. WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER, I WEINsTEIN's EVIDENCE 107103] at 39 (ed. 1982)
(scope of judge's comment on evidence adduced at trial is almost entirely within judge's discretion) [hereinafter cited as 1 WEINsTEIN's EVIDENCE]. The judge, however, must always exercise
the privilege of commentary in accordance with the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury.
Id. at 41; see infra note 6 and accompanying text (accused has constitutional right to jury trial).
2. See, e.g., Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 983 (5th Cir. 1968) (jurors are highly
sensitive to trial judge's comments on the evidence), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972); United
States v. Ah Kee Eng, 241 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1957) (judge must remember that jury is influenced by any indication of judge's view of proceedings); Gomila v. United States, 146 F.2d
372, 374 (5th Cir. 1944) (opinion of trial judge is likely to carry great weight with jury because
juries generally consider a judge's opinions to be informed and well-reasoned).
3. See Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (judge's expression
of opinion on sufficiency of evidence amounted to judicial usurpation of jury's factfinding task).
Although a federal judge may comment on the evidence to assist the jury in reaching a just decision, the jury must be the ultimate arbiter of all factual issues. See Quercia v. United States,
289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (judge may comment on evidence provided he clearly submits all matters
of fact for jury determination); see also Note, The Limits of JudicialIntervention in Criminal
Trialsand Reversible Error,11 GA. L. REV. 371, 377 (1977) (although judge controls proceedings
in criminal trial, jury is ultimate arbiter of guilt or innocence) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Intervention]. A judge's comments usurp the jury's factfinding role when a juror's knowledge that
the judge considers the defendant guilty causes the juror to abandon reasonable doubts. See 1
WEiNsTEIN's EVIDENCE supra note 1, 107[03], at 44; see also Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily ExpandingRole of the American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REv. 1, 36 (1978) (introduction of judge's
beliefs at trial is likely to influence deliberations of each juror).
The degree of impact of a judge's comments on the jury's deliberations depends on the particular circumstances of the case. See United States v. Tourine, 428 F.2d 865, 869 (2d Cir. 1970)
(reviewing court must evaluate fairness of judge's comments in context of whole trial); see generally
I WEINsTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 107[07], at 73 (appellate courts tend to rely on particular facts of case in determining propriety of trial judge's comments on evidence). Courts also
weigh the possible mitigating effect of corrective instructions when assessing whether a judge's
commentary influenced the jury. See infra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing curative
charge on respective roles of judge and jury).
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when the defendant's credibility as a witness is central to the defense's case
and is the subject of judicial comment.' A trial judge's display of partiality
regarding the defendant's credibility may undermine the jury's ability to make
an independent evaluation of the defendant's guilt.5 Because of the potential
4. See, e.g., United States v. Anton, 597 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1979) (judge should refrain
from commenting on veracity of defendant's testimony when defendant's credibility is critical
to defense); United States v. Candelaria-Gonzales, 547 F.2d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1977) (judge should
avoid displaying partiality when determination of guilt depends primarily on whether jury believes
testimony of key witness). A federal judge may use his power to comment on the credibility
of witnesses in two ways. See 1 VEnNsamN's EVIDENCE, supra note 1, at 47. The judge has the
power to advise the jury on what factors to consider when evaluating credibility. Id. The judge
is also permitted to express his own views on the believability of a witness. Id. at 47-48. If a
judge discloses his opinion on a witnesses' credibility, he must instruct the jury that they are
not bound by the judge's views. See infra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing instruction
that judge's opinion is not binding on jury). Although a federal judge may comment on a witness'
credibility, a judge's remarks generally cannot reflect his views on the believability of a defendant's testimony. See, e.g., Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 472 (1933) (judge's remark
that defendant's wringing of hands while testifying showed he was not tellifig truth held improper);
United States v. Anton, 597 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1979) (conviction reversed due to trial judge's
characterization of defendant as being entirely devoid of credibility); United States v. Stephens,
486 F.2d 915, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1973) (judge's comments expressing disbelief in defendant's testimony
repudiating confession amounted to prejudicial error). Some courts, however, have upheld the
propriety of comments attacking a defendant's credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Gaines,
450 F.2d 186, 191 (3d Cir.) (judge's statement that defendant's testimony did not make sense
and should not fool jury did not constitute reversible error), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 927 (1971);
United States v. Kravitz, 281 F.2d 581, 584-85 (3d Cir.) (judge's remark that he did not believe
all of defendant's testimony held not improper exercise of commentary power), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 941 (1960).
5. See United States v. Dopf, 434 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1970) (judge's charge that evidence
against defendant was overwhelming and sufficient for conviction deprived jury of traditional
factfinding role). A federal judge must maintain an attitude of impartiality at all times. See,
e.g., United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376, 1382 (lth Cir. 1982) (trial judge has duty to conduct trial fairly and impartially), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 735 (1983); United States v. Musgrave,
444 F.2d 755, 763 (5th Cir. 1971) (judge must avoid giving jury impression that judge believes
defendant is guilty); United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir. 1945) (federal judge
must remain detached and aloof and cannot exhibit prosecutorial zeal).
While a trial judge's comments on the evidence must not be biased, the judge may exercise
discretion in deciding which facts to mention in his commentary. See United States. v. Tourine,
428 F.2d 865, 869 (2d Cir. 1970) (trial judge may exercise discretion in selecting evidence to include in commentary); see infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text (discussion of judge's exercise of discretion in Tello in choosing facts to mention in commentary). The trial judge must,
however, guard against providing a one-sided commentary that might prejudice a defendant's
right to a fair and impartial trial. See, e.g., United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1169 (2d
Cir. 1975) (one-sided commentary of trial judge may prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976); Ray v. United States, 367 F.2d 258, 262 (8th Cir. 1966) (judge's
comments should never unfairly emphasize one party's testimony); see also United States v.
Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 1979) (judge's persistent interjections into trial evidenced
bias and thus deprived defendant of right to trial by jury). In addition, a federal judge is not
permitted to express an opinion on the defendant's guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Van Horn,
553 F.2d 1092, 1094 (8th Cir. 1977) (while judge may express opinions on facts if judge gives
limiting instructions, expression of opinion of guilt of accused is reversible error); United States
v. Smith, 399 F.2d 896, 899 (6th Cir. 1968) (conviction reversed when trial judge expressed opinion that defendant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt). See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R. FED.
377 (1971) (discussing propriety of judge expressing opinion on guilt of defendant).
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for prejudice to an accused's constitutional right6 to trial by jury, the judge
must include with his commentary an instruction that the jury is the final
arbiter of the witness' credibility and the weight of the evidence., In United
States v. Tello,8 the Fourth Circuit recently considered the permissible scope
of judicial commentary on a defendant's credibility. 9
In Tello, customs officials at Dulles International Airport arrested the
defendant when they discovered cocaine in the defendant's suitcase.'I Federal
officers at the airport charged the defendant with knowingly importing and
possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute." At trial, the defendant did
not deny possessing the drugs or transporting the drugs into the country.2
The defendant asserted, however, that an unknown drug smuggler had used
him as a "mule" to transport the cocaine into the United States.' 3 The defendant testified that an unidentified woman had approached him while he was
shopping for luggage in Peru and sold him the suitcase in which the customs
officials found the cocaine." The defendant thus claimedthat he had unknow6. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (in all criminal prosecutions accused shall enjoy right to
trial by impartial jury).
7. See United States v. Buchanan, 585 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1978) (if trial judge chooses
to comment on evidence, judge must instruct jury that they are sole judges of facts and are not
bound by judge's comments); see also United States v. Dixon, 469 F.2d 940, 942 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (trial judge may comment on evidence if ultimate resolution of factual issues is clearly
left to jury). The trial judge must include an instruction with the commentary that emphasizes
the limited effect of the judge's remarks on the evidence. See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note
1, at 13. To ensure that the jury clearly understands the limited effect of the judge's commentary,
the judge must give the instructions in close temporal proximity to the comments. See, e.g., United
States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1169 (2d Cir. 1975) (judge must give limiting instructions
simultaneously with comments on evidence), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976); United States
v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186, 190 (3d Cir. 1971) (defendant not prejudiced by judge's remarks when
judge immediately instructed jury after commentary that jury was final factual arbiter). Limiting
instructions, however, frequently cannot remedy comments that are highly prejudicial. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jacobo-Gil, 474 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1973) (judge's prejudicial remark
that evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict defendant not remedied by instructions
that jury could disregard comment); United States v. Porter, 398 F.2d 270, 276 (6th Cir. 1967)
(judge's comments evidencing belief in defendant's guilt not cured by judge's statement that jury
was not bound by remarks).
8. 707 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1983).
9. Id. at 86.
10. Id. In Tello, the customs and immigration officials first became suspicious of the defendant when the defendant displayed nervousness while being processed through customs. See Brief
for Appellee at 10, United States v. Tello, 707 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1983). After initial questioning,
the officials performed a routine customs inspection of the defendant and his belongings. 707
F.2d at 86. Although a cursory inspection yielded no evidence of contraband, custom officials
eventually discovered 510 grams of cocaine after dismantling the defendant's suitcase.Id.
11. See id; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960 & 841(a)(1) (1976).
12. See 707 F.2d at 87.
13. Id. The defendant introduced expert testimony showing that the use of unknowing
"mules" was a common drug smuggling technique. Id. The expert witness testified that narcotics
smugglers sometimes plant the drugs on automobiles, seagoing vessels, or on individuals. Id.
The smuggler retrieves the contraband once the "mule" clears international borders. Id.
14. Id.
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ingly carried the drugs into the country.' 5 Since knowledge and intent are
elements of the crimes the defendant allegedly committed,' 6 the defendant
argued that he was not guilty of the offenses because he was unaware that
he had possession of the drugs.'" After a one day trial, the judge submitted
the case to the jury.' 8 The jury, however, was unable to reach a verdict after
several hours of deliberation.' 9 The district judge therefore reinstructed the
jury on the government's burden of proof regarding the essential elements
of the offenses charged. '" The trial judge also commented to the jury on parts
of the defendant's testimony that the judge deemed determinative of the critical
issue of the defendant's mental state.' The jury subsequently convicted the
defendant of both of the charged offenses. 22
The defendant appealed to the Fourth Circuit on the ground that the
23
judge's comments prejudiced the accused's right to a fair and impartial trial.
The government, however, maintained that the district judge did not abuse
his discretion when he commented on the defendant's testimony.2" The Fourth
15. Id.
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 960 (1976) (unlawful to knowingly and intentionally import a controlled substance); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) (unlawful to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute). To obtain a conviction, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant had the required mental state when he performed the unlawful acts. See In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (prosecution must establish every element of charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
17. See 707 F.2d at 87.
18. Id.
19. Id. In Tello, the jury commenced deliberations the morning after the trial concluded.
See Brief for Appellee at 20, United States v. Tello, 707 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1983). Approximately
two hours later, the jury sent a note to the court indicating that they were deadlocked. Id. The
court thereupon reconvened and the judge instructed the jury on their factfinding role. Id. After
deliberating for approximately two more hours, the jury sent another note to the court indicating
that they were deadlocked at 6-6. Id. at 21.
20. See Brief for Appellee at 22, United States v. Tello, 707 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1983).
21. See 707 F.2d at 87. The district judge's commentary on the evidence focused primarily
on the circumstances surrounding the defendant's purchase of the suitcase from an unidentified
woman. Id. The judge remarked that, according to the defendants' testimony, the defendant
was walking through an outdoor market when "some faceless individual" in the crowd called
to him and asked him if he wanted to buy a bag. Id. The judge told the jury that "you have
got to decide for yourselves" whether "at the time this faceless person called to [the defendant]...somebody else already put cocaine in [the bag]." Id. The district judge also pointed out
weaknesses in the defendant's story, such as the accused's testimony that he never informed the
"faceless" woman of his destination. Id. The judge remarked that if the woman didn't have
"any idea where he was going...how would [she] ever catch up with the cocaine if [she] had
dumped it on somebody to bring into the United States?" Id. The judge concluded his commentary by adding, "So, you stop and think about all that sort of thing, because these are the facts
in the case." Id.
22. Id. at 86.
23. Id.; see supra note 6 (sixth amendment guarantees right to fair and impartial trial).
The defendant argued that the judge erred by failing to mention the accused's defense theories
during the commentary. Id. The defendant also claimed that the judge's remarks discounting
the defendant's testimony were tantamount to a directed verdict of guilt. Id.
24. See Brief for Appellee at 19, United States v. Tello, 707 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1983).
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Circuit held that the trial judge's remarks, although damaging to the defen-

dant's case, did not exceed the permissible bounds of judicial commentary
on the evidence. 25 The Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the defendant's
conviction. 6
The Tello court began an analysis of the propriety of the trial judge's
commentary by emphasizing that the primary limitation on a federal judge's
power to comment on the evidence is that the comments must aid the jury
in performing its factfinding function." The Fourth Circuit stated that the
proper role of a judge in the trial process is that of a trial arbiter, who directs
the jury's attention toward material issues and facilitates the correct application of law to fact.2" The Tello court pointed out that the federal court system
encourages trial judges to assist juries by commenting on the evidence.29 The
Fourth Circuit recognized that the federal practice permitting judicial commentary presumes that the comments will have an impact on jury
decisionmaking .3 The Tello court explained that grounds for reversal exist
if the judge's comments have a prejudicial effect on the defendant's right to
a fair trial. 31 According to the Tello court, a trial judge commits reversible
error when his comments effectively remove issues of fact from the jury's
consideration, thereby usurping the jury's exclusive factf'mding function.2 2 The
Fourth Circuit noted that the appellate court must consider the judge's remarks
in the context of the trial to determine whether the judge impermissibly invaded
33
the province of the jury.
25. See 707 F.2d at 88-90.
26. Id. at 90.
27. Id.; see Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469-70 (1933) (judges may comment
on evidence when commentary is necessary to aid jury in reaching just decision); supra note 1
(purpose of judicial commentary is to assist jury in factfinding process).
28. See 707 F.2d at 90.
29. Id. Although federal trial judges have broad discretion in commenting on the evidence,
the Fourth Circuit noted that many state jurisdictions either prohibit or severely curtail a trial
judge's authority to comment on the evidence. Id.; see JudicialComment on the Evidence, supra
note 1, at 205 (most states restrict judge's commentary power either by statute, constitutional
provision, or judicial decision). See generally 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 107[01]
at 10-11 n.15 (survey of state practices regarding scope of judicial commentary on the evidence).
30. See 707 F.2d at 90.
31. Id.
32. Id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that a judge's comments are improper if the remarks
compel the jury to decide an issue in a particular way. Id.; see United States v. Jacobo-Gil,
474 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1973) (judge's comment regarding defendant's knowledge usurped
jury's function by removing issue of defendant's mental state from jury consideration).
33. 707 F.2d at 90; see 1 WEINSmTN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 107[01], at 18. The extent
to which a trial judge's commentary influences the jury's deliberations depends on the particular
facts of the case. See 1 WEINsEN's EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 107[01], at 18. The complexity
and length of the trial, the nature of the evidence on which the judge commented, and the personality of the trial judge are all relevant factors in determining the impact of a judge's remarks
on a jury. Id. at 17. Since the influence of a judge's comments depends on a variety of factors,
reviewing courts tend to decide cases of alleged judicial impropriety on an ad hoc basis. Id. at
73; see United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir.) (impossible to
prescribe general rule that precisely defines limit of judicial authority), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
984 (1957).
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The Fourth Circuit assessed the propriety of the district judge's comments
in Tello by applying the guidelines for judicial commentary pronounced by
the Supreme Court in Quercia v. United States.34 In Quercia, the Supreme
Court held that a trial judge may comment on the evidence when the commentary is necessary to assist the jury in reaching a just decision. 35 The Quercia
court pointed out that although a judge's privilege to comment on the evidence
is discretionary, the privilege is subject to inherent limitations. 36 The Supreme
Court explained that a trial judge's comments must be fair and impartial and
must not include deductions and theories not readily inferrable from the
record." The Fourth Circuit in Tello examined whether the trial judge's remarks
to the jury comported with the broad standard set out in Quercia.38
In applying the Quercia standard to the Tello case, the Fourth Circuit
first addressed the defendant's contention that the district judge prejudiced
the accused by commenting only on part of the evidence adduced at trial. 39
The Tello court determined that the trial judge's limited comments were properly designed to aid the deadlocked jury in resolving the sole disputed issue
in the case.4" The Fourth Circuit explained that the defendant's guilt depended on whether the accused knowingly and intentionally transported the cocaine into the country.4 ' Although strong circumstantial evidence of knowledge
34. 707 F.2d at 88; see 289 U.S. 466 (1933). In Quercia, the trial judge had remarked to
the jury that the defendant was wringing his hands during his testimony. Id. at 468. The judge
commented that the defendant's actions indicated that he was lying. Id. The trial judge further
stated that "every single word that man said...was a lie." Id. The Supreme Court granted the
defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari, and reversed the conviction. Id. at 472. The Quercia
Court held that the judge's prejudicial remarks had deprived the defendant of his right to a fair
trial. Id. The Court reasoned that the trial judge did not comment on the defendant's testimony
to assist the jury, but merely to disparage the defendant's credibility. Id. The Quercia Court
found that the judge's impropriety prevented the jury from reaching a fair decision. Id.
35. Id. at 469. The Quercia Court noted that a trial judge can aid jury decisionmaking
by explaining evidence that is unclear, or by focusing the jury's attention on portions of the
record that the judge deems important. id.
36. Id. at 470.
37. Id. The Quercia Court stressed that a judge's comments must not distort or add to
the evidence produced at trial. Id. The Supreme Court also emphasized that a judge's commentary cannot be so hostile to the defendant as to negate the defendant's right to testify in his
own behalf. Id.
38. See 707 F.2d at 88-90; infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's application of Quercia standard to facts in Tello).
39. See 707 F.2d at 88-89. The defendant in Tello argued that the trial judge committed
reversible error by not including in the commentary important defense evidence such as the expert
testimony on the "mule" system and the defendant's good character evidence. Id. at 88. The
defendant maintained that the judge's comments were prejudicial because the judge failed to
discuss both sides of the evidence during the commentary. Id.; see Boatright v. United States,
105 F.2d 737, 740 (8th Cir. 1939) (judge should analyze both sides of evidence during commentary).
40. See 707 F.2d at 89; infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (trial judge's limited commentary in Tello did not prejudice defendant because comments were meant to assist jury in
resolving sole disputed issue in case).
41. See 707 F.2d at 88-89. In Tello, no dispute existed regarding the defendant's physical
possession of the contraband and transportation of the drugs across international borders. Id.
at 87. Conviction of the defendant depended entirely upon the government proving beyond a
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and intent existed, 42 the Tello court noted that the defendant's testimony provided the only direct evidence of his mental state when he committed the alleged
crimes. 4 3 The Fourth Circuit therefore reasoned that the trial judge limited
his comments to the defendant's testimony in an attempt to clarify for the
jury the critical issue of the defendant's mental state." The Fourth Circuit
further stated that the defendant was not prejudiced by the fact that the judge
did not comment on the defendant's good character evidence or the expert
testimony concerning the "mule" system. 45 The Tello court pointed out that
a trial judge's commentary need not address all the evidence introduced at
trial." The Fourth Circuit explained that a judge has discretion to select the
portions of the record that are crucial to the issue of guilt, and therefore worthy
of judicial comment.4 1 Since the defendant's mental state was the principle
contested issue in Tello, 4 8 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the trial judge
his remarks to evidence highly probative of the
did not err by restricting
49
accused's mental state.
After determining that the trial judge's limited comments did not prejudice the defendant, the Tello court examined whether the judge's commentary on the evidence usurped the jury's factfinding function.5 0 The Fourth
Circuit found that the trial judge's remarks on the defendant's testimony did
not interfere with the jury's ability to independently evaluate the accused's
guilt.5 ' The Tello court stated that the trial judge did not, as the defendant
claimed, 52 effectively direct a verdict by expressing an opinion on the defen-

reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally committed the illegal acts. See
supra note 17 (discussing mental state requirements of offenses defendant allegedly committed).
42. See 707 F.2d at 89. The Tello court noted that the manner in which the defendant
carried the cocaine into the country was strong circumstantial evidence of an intent to transport
the contraband across international borders. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 88; see United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 940 n.14 (2d Cir. 1963) (judge's
commentary need not refer to all evidence adduced at trial).
47. See 707 F.2d at 88-89; Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (judge's
commentary may properly focus jury's attention on portions of trial record judge considers important). Because a trial record usually is filled with conflicting evidence, the judge must direct
his commentary toward the evidence having the greatest probative value on the issue of guilt.
See United States v. Tourine, 428 F.2d 865, 869 (2d Cir. 1970) (judge's comments should assist
jury in finding truth in contradictory evidence presented at trial), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020
(1971); cf. United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982) (judge properly may
use commentary to curtail pursuit of irrelevant matters during trial), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
735 (1983).
48. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (defendant's mental state at time he committed illegal acts was only disputed issue remaining for jury consideration).
49. See 707 F.2d at 89.
50. See id. at 89-90; see infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text (Tello majority's discussion of whether trial judge's comments usurped the jury's factfinding role).
51. See 707 F.2d at 90.
52. Id. at 88. The defendant in Tello urged that during the commentary the trial judge
had effectively advised the jury that the defendant was guilty. Id.
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dant's culpability.3 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the jury may have
interpreted the judge's comments as the judge's opinion on the credibility of

the defendants testimony." The Tello court, however, stressed that a federal
trial judge is allowed to express an opinion on the evidence if the judge also
instructs the jury that they are the sole arbiters of fact." In Tello, the Fourth
Circuit noted that during the commentary the trial judge did not instruct the
jury that they could disregard his remarks on the evidence.

6

The Tello court

observed, however, that the judge concluded his commentary by referring to
a limiting instruction the judge gave the previous day.

7

Although the Fourth

Circuit considered the timing of the instruction deficient,5 8 the Tello court
concluded that the jury nevertheless understood their responsibility as the
ultimate triers of fact.5 9 Because the trial judge's comments did not usurp

that the judge's remarks
the jury's factfinding role, the Fourth Circuit 6held
0
did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
While the majority in Tello found that the trial judge did not exceed the
permissible scope of judicial commentary, the dissent concluded that the judge's
commentary had prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. 6' The Tello
dissent acknowledged the difficulty appellate courts encounter when making
post-hoc evaluations of the prejudicial effect of a judge's conduct in a criminal
trial.62 Nevertheless, the dissent maintained that the trial judge in Tello com53. Id. at 89. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the trial judge's comments did not amount
to a directed verdict because the jtidge never expressed an opinion on the defendant's guilt or
credibility. Id.; see also Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 148 (5th Cir. 1967) (trial just must
not direct verdict of guilty by commentary that decides material issue of fact for jury); Malaga
v. United States, 57 F.2d 822, 828 (1st Cir. 1932) (judge must not directly or indirectly instruct
jury that defendant is guilty).
54. See 707 F.2d at 89.
55. Id.; see Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 982 (5th Cir. 1968) (federal judge may
express opinions on evidence in criminal trial but judge has strict duty to clearly instruct jury
that they are sole arbiters of fact and are not bound by judge's comments), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 843 (1972).
56. See 707 F.2d at 89.
57. Id. The Tello court pointed out that the trial judge concluded the commentary on the
evidence by adding, "While I told you before that I wasn't going to summarize the evidence
and comment on it, I am doing so simply because I think it might help you out." Id. The Fourth
Circuit explained that the judge's statement directed the jury's attention to an instruction given
the previous day at the close of the evidence. Id. The earlier charge had advised the jury that
they could disregard any comments by the judge in reaching a verdict. Id.
58. See id. The Tello court stated that the trial judge should have reinstructed the jury
that they were the sole triers of fact at the same time that the judge commented on the evidence.
Id. at 89-90.
59. See 707 F.2d at 89. The Tello court pointed out that although an entire day had passed
since the trial judge gave the detailed instructions to the jury, only three and one-half hours
of jury time had elapsed between the instruction and the judge's comments on the evidence.
Id. The Fourth Circuit therefore reasoned that the jury still fully understood that they could
disregard the judge's remarks in reaching a verdict. See id.
60. See id. at 90.
61. See id. at 90-91 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text
(discussing dissent's reasoning in Tello).
62. See 707 F.2d at 90 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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mitted reversible error because he breached his judicial duty of impartiality.6 3
The dissent argued that the judge's comments conveyed to the jury his belief
in the defendant's guilt.6" The Tello dissent explained that the trial judge used

his commentary essentially to recount and dismiss the defendant's case as unworthy of serious consideration. 5 Since the defendant's credibility was central to his defense, the dissent reasoned that the judge's sarcastic remarks con-

cerning the accused's testimony amounted to an opinion on the defendant's
culpability.6 6 The dissent therefore concluded that the defendant in Tello was

the judge had conveyed to the jury
denied a fair and impartial trial because
67
his belief in the defendant's guilt.

Although the majority in Tello determined that the judge's comments pro-

perly assisted the jury in their factfinding task, 68 the dissent argued that the

judge's remarks prejudiced the defendant by impinging on the jury's ability
to independently decide the case. 69 The Tello majority correctly pointed out

that the federal practice permitting judicial commentary on the evidence
assumes that a judge's remarks will have an impact on the jury's

decisionmaking.70 As the Supreme Court noted in Quercia, the primary purpose of judicial commentary is to promote the just resolution of factual issues
by providing the jury access to the judge's knowledge and experience. 71 A
judge's comments on the evidence are improper if the remarks usurp rather

than assist the jury's factfinding task.72 An appellate court therefore must
63. Id.; see Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933) (judges must remain impartial since slightest intimation of bias could influence jury verdict); supra note 5 and accompanying text (trial judge's display of bias may have unduly influenced jury's decision). The dissent
in Tello claimed that the trial judge had displayed his belief that the defendant was guilty by
sarcastically reiterating the defendant's story. See 707 F.2d at 90 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
64. See 707 F.2d at 90 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. The Tello dissent contended that the trial judge's use of the adjective "faceless"
to describe the woman who allegedly sold the suitcase to the defendant betrayed the judge's disbelief
in the woman's existence. Id. The dissent also noted that the judge revealed his distrust in the
defendant's story by asking, "...who had the opportunity to do anything in the way of almost
rebuilding the bag to get cocaine in it...?" Id. The dissent finally argued that the judge's disbelief
in the accused's defense was evident in the phrase, "So, you can think to yourself..." Id. The
dissent interpreted the remark as being equivalent to saying, "How could anything so improbable
ever have happened?" Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (majority's reasoning that trial judge in
Tello properly designed commentary to aid jury in reaching just decision).
69. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (dissent's reasoning that trial judge's commentary denied defendant fair trial because judge improperly influenced jury's verdict).
70. See 707 F.2d at 90; United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 796 (2d Cir. 1976) (federal
judge must use commentary to promote jury's understanding of evidence); United States v. Tomlin,
380 F.2d 373, 374 (3d Cir. 1967) (federal judge should use commentary to make facts and circumstances of case clear to jury).
71. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (trial judges should comment
on evidence when necessary to aid jury in reaching a just decision); see also Billeci v. United
States, 184 F.2d 394, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (purpose of federal practice of judicial commentary
is to provide jury benefit of judge's expertise).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Cisneros, 491 F.2d 1068, 1074 (5th Cir. 1974) (prejudice
to defendant is inevitable when judge infringes on jury's exclusive function as ultimate trier of
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carefully weigh the facts and circumstances of the trial to determine whether
comments ostensibly offered to aid the jury actually deprived the jury of their
exclusive factfinding role.73 In Tello, the majority and dissent disagreed as
to whether the trial judge's commentary assisted or usurped the jury's deci-

sionmaking role. 74
The Fourth Circuit in Tello properly found that the trial judge did not

prejudice the defendant by limiting the commentary to the defendant's
testimony." At the Tello trial, the defendant's testimony provided the only
direct evidence of the defendant's mental state at the time he committed the

alleged crimes.76 After several hours of deliberation, the jury was unable to
agree on the truthfulness of the defendant's testimony that he did not know
his suitcase contained cocaine.77 The trial judge's commentary primarily focused
on the weaknesses in the defendant's testimony that he had been used as a

"mule" to transport the contraband into the United States. 8 As the majority
in Tello pointed out, a judge may limit his commentary to evidence presented
at trial that is crucial to the question of guilt.7 9 Since the issue of the defendant's guilt in Tello depended on the jury's decision concerning the defendant's credibility, the trial judge acted properly in focusing his comments on
the defendant's testimony." Moreover, the trial judge's decision to limit the
comments to the defendant's mental state comported with the Querciarequirement that a judge's commentary be designed to aid the jury in reaching a

just decision. 8 ' The Tello majority therefore was correct in holding that the

fact); United States v. Stephens, 486 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1973) (judge's comments must assist
jury in factfinding duties and not usurp jury's function); see supra note 3 and accompanying
text (trial judge cannot use discretionary power of commentary to usurp jury's factfinding duty).
73. See United States v. Fischer, 531 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1976) (appellate court must
determine prejudicial effect of trial judge's commentary by considering remark in context of entire prosecution); see also JudicialIntervention, supra note 3, at 378 (listing factors that reviewing courts generally consider in assessing impact of judge's comments on jury).
74. See supra notes 51-67 and accompanying text (majority and dissent in Tello disagreed
on effect of trial judge's comments on jury's deliberations).
75. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (Tello court correctly determined that
trial judge did not prejudice defendant by limiting comments to defendant's testimony).
76. See 707 F.2d at 89.
77. Id. at 87; see Brief for Appellee at 26, United States v. Tello, 707 F.2d 85 (4th Cir.
1983). At one point during deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge requesting a description
of the total contents of the defendant's suitcase. See Brief for Appellee at 21, United States v.
Tello, 707 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1983). The defendant had testified that the suitcase contained gifts
he had brought from Peru for friends in the United States. Id. at 13. The jury's request indicates
they were unable to agree on whether the defendant knew his suitcase contained cocaine.
78. See 707 F.2d at 88-89; supranote 21 (description of trial judge's commentary in Tello).
79. See 707 F.2d at 88; United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1976)
(judge's comments were proper since judge merely sought to clarify confusing testimony and
help jury understand evidence); Note, JudicialIntervention in Trials, 1973 WAsH. U.L. Q. 843,
847 (federal trial judge has duty to insure that jury correctly performs factfinding task and should
use commentary to assist jury in reaching just verdict).
80. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (judge in Tello properly performed role
as trial arbiter by directing jury's attention to key issue in case).
81. See 707 F.2d at 89; Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469-70 (1933); supra note
33 and accompanying text (discussion of Quercia holding).
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trial judge did not commit reversible error by confining his remarks to evidence
of the defendant's mental state.82
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the trial judge did not err by limiting
his comments to part of the evidence, however, is not dispositive of whether
the comments prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial.8 3 A defendant
is denied a fair trial if the judge's comments usurp the jury's factfinding role
by removing an issue of fact from the jury. 4 Judicial usurpation results when
a juror's knowledge of a judge's opinions on a factual issue causes the juror
to abandon reasonable doubts about the issue's resolution.15 Because juries
accord great weight to the views of the trial judge, courts strictly require that
the judge preface his commentary with an instruction that the jury may
disregard any inferences of the judge's opinion on the evidence when making
their final factual determination. 6 Although the trial judge in Tello never
directly expressed an opinion on the defendant's credibility, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the jury may have inferred the judge's opinion from
his commentary. 7 The Tello court concluded that the comments did not usurp
the juries factfinding task because the jury fully understood that they were
the sole arbiters of the defendant's credibility. 8 The particular facts and circumstances of the Tello trial, however, indicate that the judge's remarks may
82. See 707 F.2d at 89.
83. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (judge's comments may prejudice defendant's right to jury trial by unduly influencing jury's decision).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobo-Gil, 474 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1973) (judge held
to have improperly removed issue of defendant's mental state from jury's consideration when
judge remarked that defendant knew he had committed illegal act); United States v. Tourine,
428 F.2d 865, 869 (2d Cir. 1970) (trial judge must not use commentary to impose own opinions
on issues of fact upon jury), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971); Bursten v. United States, 395
F.2d 976, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1968) (trial judge's antagonistic and partisan comments prejudiced
defendant by influencing jury's resolution of key factual issues); United States v. Chibbaro, 361
F.2d 365, 378 (3d Cir. 1966) (reversal of conviction on ground that trial judge's remark regarding
identification of defendant was prejudicial).
85. See supra note 3 (discussion of judicial usurpation of jury's factfinding function).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Anton, 597 F.2d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 1979) (if trial judge chooses
to comment on evidence, judge must clearly inform jury that they are not bound by comments);
United States v. Diaz-Rodriquez, 478 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir.) (federal judge has wide discretion to offer observations on evidence provided it is clearly demonstrated that jury made final
factual determination), cert. dismissed, 412 U.S. 964 (1973); United States v. Musgrave, 444 F.2d
755, 762 (5th Cir. 1971) (trial judge commits reversible error if judge comments on evidence
without instructing jury that they are not bound by the comments), appeal after remand, 483
F.2d 327 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973). Although a trial judge's comments are
proper if the judge instructs the jury that they are not bound by the comments, an instruction
may not be sufficient to cure highly prejudicial remarks. See, e.g., United States v. Dopf, 434
F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1970) (constant and emphatic statements by judge that evidence was ample for conviction deprived jury of factfinding role despite instruction that jury was sole arbiter
of fact); Wheatley v. United States, 159 F.2d 599, 602-03 (4th Cir. 1946) (limiting instruction
insufficient to cure prejudice when judge gave jury strong impression that judge did not believe
defendant's testimony).
87. See 707 F.2d at 89 (majority in Tello acknowledged that jury may have interpreted
judge's comments as judge's opinion on sufficiency of evidence).
88. See id.
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have undermined the jury's ability to independently assess the truthfulness
of the defendant's testimony.89
Several factors in Tello support the conclusion that the trial judge's comments on the defendant's testimony usurped the jury's task of determining
the defendants credibility." The jury's verdict in Tello depended on whether
the jury believed the defendant's testimony. 9' The trial judge therefore commented on the pivotal issue in the case.92 Furthermore, the judge commented
on the issue of the defendant's credibility to a jury that was deadlocked on
the issue's resolution.9 3 The fact that the jury returned a guilty verdict shortly
after the judge's commentary strongly suggests that the judge's remarks may
have caused the jurors to abandon any reasonable doubt regarding the credibility of the defendant's testimony.9 '
Another factor indicating that the trial judge in Tello may have usurped
the jury's factfinding role is that the judge commented on the defendant's
credibility without at the same time instructing the jury that they could disregard
the comments when reaching a verdict.95 Although the Fourth Circuit correctly
noted the deficiency in the timing of the judge's instructions to the jury, the
Tello court nevertheless concluded that the instructions were sufficient to cure
any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the judge's comments. 96 An
examination of the facts in Tello, however, indicates the deficiency in the timing
of the instructions was prejudicial to the defendant. 97 In determining whether
limiting instructions sufficiently preserved a jury's factfinding role, reviewing
courts consider the amount of time that elapsed between the instruction and
the judge's commentary on the evidence. 98 The effectiveness of the instruc89. See notes 91-104 and accompanying text (judge's commentary to jury in Tello may
have interfered with jury's ability to independently determine defendant's credibility).
90. See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text (discussion of factors indicating that
judge in Tello usurped jury's factfinding role).
91. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (jury's decision in Tello depended on
whether jury believed defendant's testimony that he did not know suitcase contained cocaine).
92. See supra note 40 (judge in Tello commented on only issue remaining for jury consideration since defendant did not contest fact of illegal possession and transportation of
contraband).
93. See 707 F.2d at 87.
94. See Brief for Appellee at 29, United States v. Tello, 707 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1983) (jury
returned guilty verdict approximately two hours after trial judge's commentary).
95. See 707 F.2d at 89; supra text accompanying note 56 (trial judge in Tello did not instruct jury after commentary that jury could disregard judge's comments on evidence).
96. See 707 F.2d at 89-91; supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in
Tello determined that trial judge's instructions to jury were sufficient to preserve jury's factfinding role).
97. See infra text accompanying notes 100-104 (facts in Tello strongly suggest that instructions to jury were not sufficient to cure prejudice to defendant resulting from judge's comments).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1169 (2d Cir. 1975) (trial judge must
give limiting instructions simultaneously with comments on evidence to protect jury's independent right to evaluate entire case), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976); United States v. Gaines,
450 F.2d 186, 190-91 (3d Cir. 1971) (defendant not prejudiced by judge's remarks on evidence
when judge immediately instructed jury after commentary that jury was sole determiner of fact),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 927 (1972); Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950)
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tion in limiting the impact of the judge's commentary on the jury's decision

decreases as the time between the instruction and the comments increases. 99
In Tello, the Fourth Circuit found that although an entire day had passed

since the trial judge gave the instructions to the jury, only three and one-half
hours of jury time had elapsed between the instructions and the judge's
commentary.'

The Tello court therefore determined that the jury still fully

understood that they could disregard the trial judge's comments when reaching
a verdict.'0 ' The Fourth Circuit's conclusion is erroneous, however, because
the court should have considered the actual passage of time between the judge's
comments on the defendant's credibility and the limiting instructions to the

jury.'2 Since more than a day had elapsed between the judge's commentary
and the limiting instruction, the comments probably had a substantial impact
on the jury's deliberations in Tello. Additionally, the jury may have inferred

the trial judge's opinion on the credibility of the defendant's testimony from
the tone of the judge's commentary.' 3 The judge's comments therefore may

have prejudiced the defendant by impinging on the jury's ability to independent-

ly evaluate the defendant's credibility. 0 4 Because of the existence of numerous

factors indicating that the trial judge in Tello usurped the jury's factfinding
task, the Fourth Circuit may have erred in failing to reverse the defendant's
conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Tello reflects the uncertainty of appellate

review of judicial commentary on evidence presented at trial. 05 A trial judge's
power of commentary is certainly a valuable and perhaps an indispensible tool
in the administration of justice.' 6 Nevertheless, a judge must always temper
his comments with the proper degree of restraint necessary to safeguard a
defendant's constitutional right to a trial by jury.0 7 Unfortunately, the power

(judge must give limiting instruction in sufficient proximity to comments to ensure that jury clearly
understands their factfinding role).
99. See Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (limiting instructions
given long before judge's commentary on evidence do not adequately protect jury's factfinding
function).
100. See 707 F.2d at 89-90.
101. See id.
102. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (effectiveness of limiting instruction in
preserving jury's factfinding role depends on lapse of time between instruction and judge's commentary on evidence).
103. See 707 F.2d at 89; supra text accompanying note 54 (Fourth Circuit in Tello
acknowledged that jury may have inferred judge's opinion on evidence from commentary).
104. See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text (judge's commentary in Tello deprived
defendant of right to jury trial by usurping jury's task of determining defendant's credibility).
105. See infra notes 106-112 and accompanying text (lack of specific limitations on trial
judge's power of commentary hinders judicial review of cases of alleged impropriety).
106. See Note, United States v. Anton: The Right of a FederalJudge to Comment to the
Jury, 9 CAP. U.L. Rav. 161, 173 (1979) (federal judge's power to comment on evidence has
proved important to the administration of justice) [hereinafter cited as Judge's Right to
Commentary].
107. See United States v. Anton, 597 F.2d 371, 375-76 (3d Cir. 1979) (trial judge must exercise restraint in using power of commentary to protect defendant's constitutional right to fair trial).
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of commentary exists in the federal system without the benefit of specific rules
of limitation. 0 8 The trial judge therefore has no definite guidelines by which
to measure the propriety of his comments on the evidence in a particular instance. The broad standard set out by the Supreme Court in Quercia °9 has
the advantage of flexibility,"' but also the corresponding disadvantage of imprecision. Moreover, although a federal judge may never directly express his
views on the guilt of the accused,"' no such absolute prohibition exists when
a judge's commentary on the ultimate issue in the case amounts to an expression of opinion on the defendant's culpability.11 2 The lack of a definite rule
governing situations in which the trial judge indirectly directs a verdict by
commenting on defense testimony gives rise to the kind of post-hoc rationalization evident in Tello. Until Congress or the Supreme Court sets more specific
limitations on a federal judge's power of commentary, appellate courts and
practitioners will continue to face uncertainty in cases of alleged judicial
misconduct.
In United States v. Tello, the Fourth Circuit examined the propriety of
a trial judge's comments to a deadlocked jury concerning crucial defense
testimony.' 3 Applying the general standard eftunciated by the Supreme Court
in Quercia, the Fourth Circuit held that the trial judge did not invade the
jury's exclusive province of determining all issues of fact.' " The Tello court,
however, erred in reasoning that the trial judge's deficient limiting instructions were adequate to mitigate any prejudice to the defendant's right to a
fair trial.' '5 The judge's commentary in Tello probably impaired the jury's

108. See Judges Right of Commentary, supra note 106, at 173 (no definite rules exist to
distinguish between objectionable and fair commentary on evidence).
109. See 289 U.S. at 469-70; supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussion of Quercia holding).
110. See 707 F.2d at 88 (most courts apply broad Querciastandard because standard is adaptable to circumstances of any trial).
111. See supra note 5 (trial judge commits reversible error by expressing opinion on defendant's guilt).
112. Cf. 1 VEI STEmN'S EVImENCE, supranote 1, 107[03], at 39 (lack of definite restrictions
on judge's privilege to express opinions on evidence enables appellate courts to uphold jury verdict when judge discloses views indirectly). A trial judge may disclose his opinions on the merits
of a case in a variety of subtle ways. See generally Note, Judge'sNon-Verbal Behavior In Jury
Trials: A Threat To JudicialImpartiality, 61 VA. L. REv. 1266, 1270-75 (1975) (discussing various
ways in which judges nonverbally convey views on evidence to jury). For example, changes in
the tone of voice, facial expression, or the use of gestures can convey to a jury a judge's views
on the weight of the evidence or the credibility of a witness' testimony. See Conner, The Trial
Judge, His FacialExpression, Gestures,and GeneralDemeanor- TheirEffect on the Administration of Justice, 1965 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 251, _
; United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 237
(3d Cir. 1982) (judge must be careful never to convey views on defendant's guilt through demeanor), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 13, 1983) (No. 82-1464).
113. See 707 F.2d at 88-90.
114. See supra notes 27-60 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's decision in
Tello).
115. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit incorrectly determined
that limiting instruction given day before commentary was sufficient to cure possible prejudice
from judge's comments on evidence).

